This paper describes the first iteration of a topdown approach for building a computer simulation model for use in the evolution and evaluation of strategic aeromedical evacuation policy and planning. The model is modular in nature, completely data driven, quickly adaptable to scenario changes, and meant for use as a policy/planning aid for the Air Mobility Command Surgeon and his staff. In addition, this paper demonstrates the value of using factor analysis in validating a simulation model. It is seen that these techniques can also be employed by a decision-maker to identi~the most important factors in a model and describe the relationships between them.
smaller campaigns around the world increases, USAF medical planners also require a flexible, analytical tool which captures the major elements of this important mission in order to quickly evaluate differing medical airlifi plans and policies.
The model described in this paper was developed to meet these objectives.
A Brief History of Strategic AE Strategic aeromedical evacuation has its roots in the Vietnam
War when, for the frost time, the USAF airlifted casualties directly fkom the theater of operations (Saigon) to Andrews AFB in the CONUS, reducing the total patient travel time by as much as three days (Department of the Air Force 1992a). This new concept saved countless lives. Since then, the minimization of both the travel time from the theater of operations to the CONUS and the number of times a patient is handled during this transit to a hospital has guided nearly all basic efforts to improve strategic AE operations. Stimulated by these two goals, in May of 1986, Congress authorized the Military Airlift Command, now the Air Mobility Command, to use aircraft ffom the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to accomplish strategic AE during wartime.
For the first time, dedicated aircraft were assigned to this important mission. During the recent Gulf War, with our airlift capabilities stretched beyond their limits, our forces experienced miraculously low casualty rates. Fortunately, the question of how well the AE system could have serviced mass casualties, originally anticipated to reach into the thousands, did not demand a real answer. It is expected that AE will play an even more visible and prominent role in fiture warfare. 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT
The simulation model was written using the personal computer version of SIMSCRIPT 11.5. The use of SIMSCRIPT was specified by the sponsor and turned out to be a good choice since it allowed a modular, data-driven design (as described later) to be readily incorporated and is very portable, requiring only slight inputloutput modifications to run on different machines. These aircraft are based on either the east or west coast of the United States. Each can be used to fly any one of 37 different routes between the basing locations, the APOES, and the CONUS destinations.
Casualties begin arriving on day one in the SWA theater and 40 days later they begin arriving in the Far East. Figure 1 shows the rate at which approximately 67,000 patients will arrive over the 180 day period. Patients are of eight different types and must be assigned to hospital beds in the CONUS appropriate for their type of injury.
A total of 142,000 beds axe available in the six CONUS regions for patients, with 37,000 available at DOD hospitals, 34,000 at VA hospitals, and the rest at NDMS hospitals. Validating a model such as this is a much more formidable task since it portrays a system that, although currently foreseen and planned for, does mot yet exist. That is, the strategic AE process being modelled is actually nothing more than a plan, based on general policies, to employ during periods of conflict a set of resources that are used in different ways ducing peacetime.
The Boeing 767 aircraft are presently airliners that will come from the CRAF. Likewise, 93 percent of the personnel that will execute the plan will come from the Air Reserve Component (Department of the Air Force 1992b).
The authors have aggressively pursued the threestep approach for model validation described by Law and Kelton (1991) . The first step, referred to as gaining "high face validity," describes how this research began. There have been two face-to-face meetings with both the end user (the AMC medical planning staff) and the organization that will inherit and exercise the tool. These meetings with the "system experts" produced the fi-amework and assumptions for the simulation model. We found factor analysis to be particularly well-suited for this task since it can provide a simplified description of the complex interrelationships that exist among the multiple output variables which, in turn, can then be compared against the insights and intuition of the system experts.
We discuss these last two validation steps in more detail in the following sections.
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS
The objective of this analysis was to assess model validity by examining the effects of changing one input factor at a time on a single measure of system performance--the average time patients spend in the strategic AE system, as measured from the time a patient is stabilized (and thus eligible for AE) to the time he/she arrives at the CONUS region.
Five input factors that were expected to be important were identified and "baseline" levels for each were postulated. by In the baseline scenario, patients are regulated every eight hours and are first assigned to DOD beds in the closest CONUS region.
Once a certain specified proportion of DOD beds in that region are filled, patients are assigned to DOD beds in the next closest region.
Once all DOD beds are filled in all regions, patients are then assigned to VA beds in nearest region order. If all these are filled, they are then assigned to NDMS beds, again in nearest region order. We refer to this as the "organization-then-region" fill policy.
An alternative regulation policy is to search for a bed for a given patient fwst within a region in DOD-VA-NDMS order. Once a region is fill, the search continues in the next closest region. This is referred to as the "region-then-organization" fill policy.
The baseline case also assumes that command and control of the CRAF fleet is "centralized" in the sense that the aircraft are under the control of a single integrated manager and can be assigned to routes in either theater as needed. An alternative structure, described here simply as "decentralized," places the aircraft under the control of the theater commanders and limits their service to routes specific to their assigned theater.
Five replications of the simulation were performed for the baseline scenario and for twenty-three others which differed from the baseline case (or each other) by changing the level of one factor. Table 1 summarizes the results for the baseline case and seven of the most interesting alternatives. The choice to regulate fwst across CONUS regions produced the most dramatic improvement, a nearly 25% reduction in average time in system. In fact, the average time in system for every run that used the regulation policy "region-then-organization" was about 25'?40smaller than when the "organization-then-region" policy was used. Increasing the regulation ffequency to once every 4 hours for each theater was the only other policy change that decreased time in system. Decreas-ing the regulation frequency increased time in system, It was, at first, surprising that decreasing the number of aircraft from 45 to 15 only slightly increased the time in system, as did changing to decentralized command and control. On the other hand, when the combination of these two changes was applied, average time in system ballooned to 116.8 hours. This, however, reflects the fact that 15 aircratl are essentially adequate to handle the demand provided that they can be assigned to either theater as needed. When they are dedicated to theaters, missions may be delayed in one theater while aircraft sit idle in the other.
Time in system was seen to be insensitive to increases in MOG from its baseline value of three.
However, when 1 unit of MOG was removed, time in system rose dramatically to 108.4 hours. This suggests that the use of MOG to represent the aggregated resources at an APOE has introduced a lack of fidelity that requires attention.
In all, however, the results of this one-at-a-time analysis suggested that the model was performing in accordance with the experts' intuition, To then investigate the magnitude or relative importance of the five main input factors and to check for the existence of possible interactions between them, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the results from a full 25 factorial experiment wherein each factor was varied between two relatively high and low levels. The factor level settings are displayed in Table 2 . Five replications were performed at each design point. [The description of factor analysis which follows is based on discussions found in both Dillon and Goldstein (1984) and Morrison (1976) .] In particular, we apply factor analysis to the output obtained from the results of the experiment described earlier in Table 2 . Five replications of the simulation were performed at each of the 32 design points and the following seven output variables were observed:
1. Average time patients spend in the AE system; 2. Average time in system for the Far East theate3
. Average time in system for the SWA theater; 4. Average aircraft utilization (ute) rate; 5. Maximum aircraft utilization rates over the length of the conflict (measured every ten days); 6. Average number of patients in all 3E facilities; 7. Percentage of missions that were delayed because there were no aircraft available to fly the mission.
Factor analysis assumes that the output variables are linear functions of a small number of unobservable "common factors" and an unobservable "unique" or "specific factor."
That is, it assumes a model of the form J "lh unobservable elements are asstandard normal a vector representing the unique factor associated with response variable i whose elements are assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean; the "factor loading" which relates the jti common factor to the ith response variable;
and the e,'s are assumed to be independent random vectors that are, in turn, independent of the common factors.
In this case, the factor loading Aij represents the correlation between the iti output variable and the j'h factor and thus relates the degree to which a specific variable loads on the specific factor.
We (somewhat arbitrarily) assume that the appropriate number of common factors to use in this case is m = 3. This is based on the common judgement that more than two or three factors are generally not needed and are difficult to interpret.
[It is also consistent with the results of a preliminary principal components analysis, as described in Wolfe (1993 ) .] A set of factor loadings for our observed output is summarized in Table 3 . Loadings (or correlations) whose absolute values are greater than 0.3 can be considered significant. it is possible to obtain an infinite number of sets of factor loadings for a specific set of observations of the output variables, with each set corresponding to a different rotation or reflection of the coordinate axes of the m-dimensional common-factor space. The loadings displayed in Table 3 result from a "varimax rotation" which has mathematical properties usually associated with a set of meaningful and interpretable common factors.)
The factor loadings (i.e., the kii's) can be used to help interpret what the factors represent.
Usually, the highest loadings for each component are identified and the analyst then attempts to assign a meaning or interpretation to each factor accordingly. In our case, it appears ffom Table 3 that the first factor is an overall measure of patient handling since it the highest loadings occur for patient time in system (overall and Far East) and the number in 3E hospitals awaiting transport. The second factor appears to be a measure of aircraft use since heavy loadings are obtained for the two utilization rates and the percentage of missions delayed. The third factor has a high loading only for a single variable, time in system for the Southwest Asia theater.
To help better understand what these factors mean, one can additionally estimate the values of the common factors corresponding to each observation from our simulation experiment, usually referred to as the "factor scores."
These are obtained by estimating "scoring coefficients" which are used to compute the factor scores as linear combinations of the values of the output variables and are obtained using regression methods. Table 4 displays the standardized scoring coefficients that can be used to compute the factor scores for each of the 160 observations in the designed experiment. First, there are two distinct groups of data alon~the Factor 2 axis which clearly correspond to the number of aircraft.
Factor 2 is thus labeled "Airlift
Resources." This is consistent with the fact that the variables which describe aircraft utilization load high on this factor. It is also interesting that several items influence the variance along the Factor 1 axis. The primary variable is MOG, with higher values of MOG being toward the bottom of the graph. For this reason Factor 1 is labeled "APOE Resources." Within each MOG subgroup, another set of groups is defined by the regulation policy, with "region-then-organization" producing lower Factor 1 scores. In general, because the overall time in system and the time in system for the Far East theater load heavily on Factor 1, the lower the Factor 1 score, the lower are these measures of performance. Therefore, Factor 3 is labeled "Regulation Policy/Coordination." Additionally, the observations within the "region-then-organization" groups tend to be more tightly clustered than those within the "organization-then-region" groups. This is because the former policy is more flexible in handling fewer airlift in a decentralized command and control structure. Figure 4 , the plot of Factor 2 versus Factor 3, again shows a big split in the observations along the Airlift Resources (Factor 2) axis. Note that the higher the number of aircraft, the lower the factor score. Since the utilization rates load heavily on this factor and since the ute rates are inversely related to the number of aircraft, a higher number of aircraft produces lower ute rates and, thus, lower factor scores.
Again, the variance along the Factor 3 (Regulation Policy/Coordination) axis is defined by the regulation policy and the regulation frequency. Interestingly, since Factor 3 is heavily loaded by time in system for the SWA theater, as ti&e in system for the Southwest Asia theater decreases, so too does the Factor 3 score.
Finally, with 15 aircraft, the tradeoffs between regulation policy and frequency are more complex than they are with 45 aircraft. This makes sense since the more resources one has, the more options there should be.
Many, many more inferences can be made horn these plots. The point is that they unveil what the main factors are and how they are related, and spur both the modeler and the planner to ask key what-if questions.
INSIGHTS & CONCLUSIONS
Three main factors appear to significantly affect strategic AE operations: resources located at an APOE, the regulation policy used, and the number of aircraft available.
The prominent role of MOG on "APOE Resources" factor again suggests that model fidelity could be enhanced by modeling APOE operations more explicitly.
'A large amount of interaction exists between the major elements of strategic AE, indicating that there is vast potential for tradeoffs, depending on the end user's objectives.
There are many possible uses for this simulation model. Some particular objectives that could be accommodated and which would be of interest to medical planners are: q to assist CRAF activation planning in estimating the cost of different activation options (e.g., numbers of aircraft or aircraft capacities) based on an expected utilization rate of the fleet;
q to identi~the set of regulating policies that will work best under the most common scenario conditions;
q to identi~and plan for bed shortages by patient type; q to study the effect of limiting bed availability to certain organizational types, such as just DOD, or DOD and VA only; q to study broad medical resource allocation tradeoffs, for example, the tradeoff between assigning trained medical personnel to aircrews or assigning them to 3E or 4E facilities.
There are many more topics that could be discussed, but the point is that the model has the fidelity and flexibility to address these types of questions fairly quickly. Further, the use factor analysis can also simply this analysis by focusing attention on a few key common factors.
After the model is used to answer some of these type questions, no doubt it will spur the medical planners to explore even more options and ask more questions.
The proper application of this tool should, in the end, result in better medical contingency plans. Col Joe Litko; who guided this effort based on his personal experiences modeling contingency airlift operations during Grenad~Desert Storm, and Somalia. 
